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Abstract Pollution-induced illnesses are caused by toxicants that result from
human activity and are often entirely preventable. However, where indus-
trial priorities have undermined responsible governance, exposed populations
must reduce their exposure by resorting to voluntary protective measures
and demanding emissions abatement. This paper presents a coupled human-
environment system (HES) model that represents the effects of water pollution
on the health and livelihood of a fishing community. The model is motivated by
an incident from 1949-1968 in Minamata, Japan, where methylmercury eﬄu-
ent from a local factory poisoned fish populations and humans who ate them.
We model the critical role of risk perception in driving both social learning
and the protective feedbacks against pollution exposure. These feedbacks are
undermined in the presence of social misperceptions such as stigmatization of
the injured. Through numerical simulation and scenario analysis, we compare
our model results with historical datasets from Minamata, and find that the
conditions for an ongoing pollution epidemic are highly unlikely without social
misperception. We also find trade-offs between human health outcomes, the
viability of the polluting industry and the survival of the fishery. We conclude
that an understanding of human-environment interactions and misperception
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effects is highly relevant to the resolution of contemporary pollution problems,
and merits further study.
Keywords human-environment interactions, social learning, pollution
abatement, misperception effects, trade-offs
1 Introduction
A human-environment system (HES) is characterized by the interaction of hu-
man activities and natural processes (Liu et al 2007; Levin and Clark 2010),
and may also be called a socio-ecological system (SES) when biota are involved
(Anderies 2014). Pollution effects on populations and natural resources and
the human responses to those effects can exemplify human-environment inter-
actions: human activities can cause an increase in pollution, which in turn can
feed back to change human perception and behaviour, and possibly stimulate
efforts to control the pollution.
For some applications, mathematical modellers assume that a policymaker
wishes to ameliorate environmental impacts, and has the power to make a de-
cision under constraints. Under these conditions, it is possible to use optimal
control theory to understand how the policymaker can optimize the ameliora-
tion efforts. This approach is used in the context of pollution HESs and similar
systems involving humans and their environment (Withagen 1995; Eichner and
Pethig 2006; Dubey 2010; Heijnen and Wagener 2013; Anderies 2014). How-
ever, for other applications, it may be desirable to incorporate forces into the
model that cause policymakers to act in the first place, such as public pressure.
For example, legal theorists who study the regulatory compliance of pollut-
ing industries observe that government policy may not be enforced effectively
without pressure from citizens (Van Rooij 2010). Social misperception can be
the single largest obstacle to resolving pollution problems. Sometimes this is
fuelled by an inconclusive scientific understanding, given that the symptoms of
pollution exposure can be slow to appear, and difficult to separate from other
causes or confounding variables (Van Rooij 2010; Harada 1972; Grandjean
et al 2010). Misperception may also be fuelled by economic expediency and
deliberate foul play. Therefore, citizen action and changing social perception
play a large role in helping to resolve pollution problems.
Recognizing that policy decisions depend on social influences and behaviours
that emerge from group interactions, social learning models are increasingly
used in mathematical epidemiology to study vaccine scares (Bauch and Bhat-
tacharyya 2012), and in ecology to study resource management and conserva-
tion (Satake et al 2007; Innes et al 2013; Barlow et al 2014). The idea is that
individuals adopt strategies based partly on their own self-interest, and partly
from exchanging information with others in a society to imitate the normative
behaviour of the group (Satake et al 2007).
The factory emitted methylmercury directly into Minamata Bay (Jesty
2012; George 2001; Ui 1992; Yorifuji et al 2013), where it posed a hazard to
humans and organisms due to its high protein-binding affinity and its potential
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to bioaccumulate rapidly in food chains (Goel 2006; Jackson 1998). As fish was
the main source of dietary protein for people in Minamata and was ingested
in high quantities (George 2001; Laws 2000; D’Itri 1991), it was not long
before people started showing severe neurological symptoms linked with eating
fish from the bay. To avoid financial responsibility and pursue record high
production, Chisso and its allies in Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and
Industry concealed test results and stalled independent research that linked
the illness to its emissions(Harada 1972; Ui 1992; Smith and Smith 1975).
Faced with ambiguous information and a lack of leadership from the gov-
ernment and industry, the people in Minamata had to resort to their own
decision-making and voluntary measures to protect their health. These volun-
tary actions included fish-eating boycotts and protests to demand pollution
abatement. By 1960, fish-eating was reduced, and protests had compelled the
government to intervene (Yorifuji et al 2013; Littlefield 1996; Harada 1995;
George 2001; Smith and Smith 1975).
Although citizens had acted and secured government attention, the emis-
sions were not completely abated. The pushback from those who supported
the company was significant. Many citizens were reticent to blame pollution on
a company that they depended upon for their income (Van Rooij 2010), and
many viewed the existing pollution victims and the appearance of new victims
as a threat to their livelihood. Workers feared that the factory could be shut
down (George 2001), and fishermen feared that their fish would not sell (Smith
and Smith 1975). This fed a social stigmatization that dissuaded the injured
from coming forward with their symptoms, so that the true extent of the dam-
ages remained hidden for many years. Believing that the danger was over after
1960, the community regained confidence in fish-eating even though the pol-
lution continued (George 2001) (Harada 1972). After 1960, nearly 200 people
developing the full set of mercury-poisoning symptoms were overlooked, while
thousands more were exposed (Harada 1995; George 2001; Harada 1975). This
latent pollution epidemic continued until 1968, when a second methylmercury-
poisoning incident was discovered in another region of Japan, prompting the
government to recognize the pollution problem in Minamata.
Although the Minamata incident occurred 50 years ago, it is very relevant
to contemporary pollution problems. Minamata represents highly localized
human-environment interactions, and gives us an opportunity to understand
both the pollution feedback effects on human health and fishing, and the social
feedbacks in response to the pollution.
The HES model that we present in this paper couples phenomena that up
to now have been modelled only separately, and introduces new links that allow
us to ask new questions. Using differential equations (ODEs), we incorporate
social learning into the HES by representing pollution abatement as a dynamic
function of the aggregate public demand for it, rather than as a static optimal
control parameter. This allows us to examine the role of changing social atti-
tudes, pressures, and misperceptions in the effort to control pollution damages.
The demand for abatement changes in response to the changing perception of
health risk (Bauch and Bhattacharyya 2012; Innes et al 2013).
4 Michael Yodzis et al.
Our objectives are to examine the ecological and social conditions that
cause the outbreak of a pollution-induced epidemic, and to study the role of
social feedbacks and misperception effects that allow the epidemic to persist.
2 Methods
This model couples three subsystems: the population dynamics of a fishery,
the dynamics of pollution exposure and the perception of its symptoms, and
the social learning dynamics underlying the public pressure to abate pollution.
Since parts of this model are developed here for the first time, we provide a
detailed model derivation in section S1 of the Supplementary Material.
To maintain our focus on numerical simplicity and qualitative behaviour,
we build a system of normalized equations whose state variables are propor-
tions rather than absolute quantities. The system is driven by an exogenous
input n(t), which is the baseline emissions loading rate from an industry into
a water source. Whereas n(t) is a prescribed function, the net emissions load-
ing E(t) is affected by feedback from the social demand for abatement. The
fishery consists of fish F (t) and boats B(t), whose interactions are governed
by Lokta-Volterra type equations and emissions mortality.
Human injuries are driven by the fish-borne pollution exposure. This ex-
posure depends on the net emissions level E(t), the fish catch HF (t)B(t) with
harvest rate H, and a factor of pollution availability to humans, I .
To model human perception, we introduce P (t) for the perceived injured
and I(t) for the actual injured. The parameter s is the stigma rate, or the
rate at which the community denies new victims as the perceived injured
P (t) increases. This stigma effect causes a disparity between the actual and
perceived number of injured. If there is no stigma, s = 0, then I(t) and P (t)
grow at the same rate. However, when s > 0, then a distinct negative feedback
is introduced in P ′: the rate at which the community is willing to recognize
new victims decreases as the number of perceived victims increases. Then P (t)
is an underestimate of the actual health damages I(t).
As Figure 1 shows, all social feedbacks and decisions are driven by P (t),
but they are blind to I(t). P (t) affects the level of fish-eating, 1−bP (t), where
b is the boycott rate. P (t) also influences the public demand for abatement
X(t), which grows according to a social learning dynamic. In turn, X(t) feeds
back to influence the net emissions E(t), thus closing the loop.
Altogether, the equations for the human-environment system are:
F ′(t) = rF (t)(1− F (t))−HF (t)B(t)− FE(t)F (t)
B′(t) = (1− bP (t))HF (t)B(t)− cB(t)
I ′(t) = IE(t)HF (t)B(t) [1− bP (t)− I(t)]
P ′(t) = IE(t)HF (t)B(t) [1− bP (t)− sP (t)− P (t)]
X ′(t) = κX(t)(1−X(t)) [hP (t)− βX(t)]
 (1)
where the net emissions loading E(t) is given by:
E(t) = n(t) (1− f(X(t))) (2)
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Fig. 1: Causal links and feedback loops among the state variables in the human-
environment system. Observe the critical role that human perception plays
(shown in bold) as a hub for the relay of information. The stigma term −sP
acts to dampen the growth of the perceived injured, creating an underestima-
tion of the actual injured. This distorts the signals needed for the fish-eating
boycott −bP and the demand for pollution abatement X to fulfil their pro-
tective functions.
Note that the form of the abatement function f(X) is important. It should
be monotone increasing in X, and have a social concern threshold x˘ above
which there is complete abatement: i.e. whenever X ≥ x˘, then f(X) = 1 and
E(t) = 0. Table 1 gives a summary of the model variables and parameters. See
the Supplementary Material for more details.
As mentioned in the historical background of Minamata, the emissions may
have continued indefinitely (albeit at a reduced, but still dangerous level) and
the pollution victims forgotten, if it had not been for a singular event that our
model does not capture. That event is the 1965 outbreak of methylmercury-
poisoning in Niigata, Japan, at an acetaldehyde factory run by a different
company far from Minamata.
Then, in our simulations and analysis, we are interested in the conditions
for a nontrivial equilibrium where the emissions and the fish catch coexist (i.e.
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the route of exposure remains open), and where the true number of injured
I continues to grow in the background long after the perceived injured P has
settled down to its steady-state.
Table 1: HES Model Variables and Parameters
Variable Meaning Units Range
E Net Emissions Loading Proportion [0, 1]
F Fish Population proportion [0, 1]
B Boats Proportion of Bthreshold ≥ 0
I Cumulative Injured Population proportion [0, 1]
P Cumulative Perceived Injured Population proportion [0, 1]
X Demand for pollution abatement Population proportion [0, 1]
f(X) Abatement level Proportion [0, 1]
Parameter Meaning Units Range
H Harvesting rate 1/year [0, 1]
r Fecundity 1/year (0, 1]
c Normalized boat costs 1/year (0, 1]
F Fish pollution mortality 1/year [0, 1]
I Pollution availability to humans 1/(unit emissions) [0, 1]
b Rate of fish boycott per unit injury 1/(fraction increase in P ) ≥ 0
s Rate of stigmatization per unit injury 1/(fraction increase in P ) ≥ 0
κ Sampling and imitation rate 1/year [0, 1]
h Rate of health concern per unit injury 1/(fraction increase in P ) ≥ 0
β Pushback to demand for abatement 1/(fraction increase in X) ≥ 0
x˘ Social concern threshold Population proportion [0, 1]
Our system has 9 equilibria, with a single nontrivial equilibrium
F ∗
B∗
I∗
P ∗
X∗
 =

c
H(1−bP∗)
1
H (r (1− F ∗)− F (1− f(X∗)))
1+s
1+b+s
1
1+b+s
h
β(1+b+s)
 (3)
In general, this equilibrium exists and is locally stable if the following three
inequalities hold. These occur when the social concern is below the threshold
needed to abate the emissions,
0 ≤ h
β(1 + b+ s)
< x˘ (4)
when the fish reproduction rate exceeds the pollution mortality,
r > F (1− f(X∗)) (5)
and when the returns from the harvest exceed the cost of fishing,
c < H(1− bP ∗)
(
1− F (1− f(X
∗))
r
)
. (6)
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However, the HES is sensitive to its initial conditions. Even if the inequal-
ities for a nontrivial equilibrium are satisfied, it will not occur if F (t0), B(t0)
and X(t0) are sufficiently small, for a given set of parameters, such that the fish
catch collapses before the emissions are reduced. See Supplementary Material
sections S2, S3 and S4 for more detail.
3 Results
3.1 Historical Datasets and Parameter Selection
Most of the data available from Minamata is incomplete or sampled at irregular
time intervals, making it ill-suited for a rigorous parameter recovery. Rather
than estimate the parameters from the data, we make simulations that agree
qualitatively with the information we have from Minamata.
Table 2.1 shows the available datasets, and Table 2.2 summarizes our choice
of parameters and initial conditions for the simulation. Table 2.3 contains the
simulation plots. Observe that the datasets are reported in absolute numbers,
while the simulated variables are plotted as proportions.
To model the baseline emissions n(t), we consider the emissions dataset
closely. Prior to 1959, emissions levels increased as part of technical improve-
ments at the factory, the details of which are exogenous to our model. After
1959, emissions were reduced due to public demand for abatement. In our
model, we define the following baseline emissions function:
n(t) :=
{0− 100% interpolated data t ≤ 1959
100% (continuing 1959 level) t > 1959
(7)
where we take interpolated emissions data up to 1959, and assume that peak
levels occur in 1959. The emissions continue at 100% of 1959 levels if there is
no abatement.
To define the relationship between social concern and abatement, we spec-
ify a function f(X). Although emissions were abated after 1959, Tsuru reports
that many Minamatans supported the company into the 1970s (Tsuru 1999),
so it was a vocal minority of citizens that demanded abatement. We take f to
be a nonlinear function
f(X) :=
{ 0 0 ≤ X ≤ 0.2
−250(X − 0.2)2(X − 0.5) 0.2 ≤ X ≤ 0.4
1 0.4 ≤ X ≤ 1
(8)
where x˘ = 0.4 is the threshold of social concern above which emissions are
fully abated.
There is data for the fish catch in Minamata Bay but not for the actual fish
population, so the fish population that we generate in the simulation should
be regarded as theoretical. The data for the number of fishing households (1)
in Minamata and (2) in the villages Tsukinoura, Detsuki, Yudo, and Modo
is used as an indirect estimate for the number of boats in Minamata Bay
(Michiko 2003; Tsurumi 2007).
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Table 2: We use historical datasets (Table 2.1) to select parameters for the
HES model (Table 2.2) and generate simulations of Minamata (Table 2.3).
Sources: emissions data (Harada 1975); fish catch data (Harada 1972); fish-
ing households data (Michiko 2003; Tsurumi 2007); cumulative injured data
(Harada 1975); protest events data (Almeida and Stearns 1998).
Emissions Fishery Injuries Abatement Demand
2.1 Minamata Datasets
f
• Emissions (kg)
e
m
is
s
io
n
s
(
k
g
)
t (years)
• Fish Catch (kg),• Fishing
Households (#)
1 2
c
a
t
c
h
(
k
g
)
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
s
(
#
)
t (years)
(1) Minamata
(2) Tsukinoura, Detsuki,
Yudo, and Modo
Cumulative Injured (#)• Perceived• Actual
c
a
s
e
s
(
#
)
t (years)
• Environmental
Protest Events
in Japan (#)
e
v
e
n
t
s
(
#
)
t (years)
2.2 Parameter Selection
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F (1945) = 1.0
B(1945) = 0.1
H = 0.7/year
c = 0.35/year
r = 1.0/year
F = 0.7/year
f
I(1945) = 0
P (1945) = 0
I = 0.009
b = 100
s = 600
f
X(1945) = 0.01
κ = 0.5/year
h = 1000
β = 4.0
2.3 Minamata Simulation
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As the fish catch data is incomplete, we also make use of qualitative histor-
ical information. In 1945, the fish stocks around Minamata were high, as they
had not been fished since before the second world war (Keibo and Masato
2001). After the war, both fishing pressure (Keibo and Masato 2001) and
methylmercury pollution reduced the fish stocks. While the data are insuffi-
cient to separate the effects of pollution and fish harvesting on the mortality
of fish, we can assume that F and H together outpace the fecundity r. Not
shown in the fish catch data, but reported in (George 2001; Harada 1972, 1995)
is that after fishing was reduced in 1957 and emissions were reduced in 1959,
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some species were observed to recover to levels deemed fit to fish openly again
by 1964.
The data for the cumulative injured over the years 1945-1976 comes from
(Harada 1975). We take the “perceived injured” to be all cases discovered up
to 1960, while the “actual injured” include additional cases discovered retro-
spectively in a 1971 epidemiological survey. Adjusting for the population size
of Minamata over this period, we scale these datasets to estimate I , b and
s. Public opinion poll data about social concern for pollution is not avail-
able from Minamata. Instead, we observe that social concern toward pollution
at the nationwide-level in Japan underwent an increase during this period,
judging from annual time series data on the number of anti-pollution social
movement activities reported in Japanese newspapers, journals and magazines
from 1955-1974 (Almeida and Stearns 1998). These activities include marches,
rallies, demonstrations, and demands made by anti-pollution groups.
3.2 Simulations and Scenario Analysis
Given that the social parameters s, b and h have been selected to agree qual-
itatively with the data, we concede that there is substantial uncertainty in
the values selected. To provide context for the choices made in Table 2.2, we
depict the steady-states of the system in s-b parameter space. We numerically
solve F , B and X for large time t = 1000000, and colour regions in s-b space
according to the equilibrium type (I, II, III or IV) as defined in Table 3. See
Supplementary Material sections S3 and S4 for more detail.
Table 3: Equilibria Types (and associated Region Colours)
1− f(X∗) = 0 1− f(X∗) > 0
F ∗B∗ = 0 I) No Fish Catch,
No Emissions
III) No Fish Catch,
Emissions
F ∗B∗ > 0 II) Fish Catch,
No Emissions
IV) Fish Catch,
and Emissions
The coloured s-b space is shown in Figure 2.c, and its regions are divided by
numbered and coloured contour lines, given in Legend 1. These contour lines
are based on the inequalities (4)-(6), as explained in more detail in section S5
of the Supplementary Material.
The s-b space in Figure 2.c is accompanied by representative time series
plots in Figures 2.a,b,d,e. Each figure depicts solutions to the HES system that
illustrate the dynamic behaviour of a particular equilibrium type (I, II, III, or
IV). The time series in these plots are coloured according to Legend 2.
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Fig. 2: Changing values for the social feedbacks s (stigma) and b (boycott)
yield alternative qualitative outcomes. The parameter plane (c) shows the
dynamical outcomes defined by the equilibrium-types I, II, III, and IV that
result for various values of s and b. The accompanying time series plots are
simulated at fixed values of s and b, and each is representative of a particular
outcome: (a) I: s = 0, b = 500, (b) III: s = 600, b = 800, (d) I: s = 0, b = 100,
(e) IV: s = 600, b = 100. The scenario in (e) corresponds to the Minamata
simulation defined in Table 2.3.
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3.2.1 Stigma/Misperception Undermines Protective Social Feedbacks
Figure 2.e depicts the Minamata simulation that we generated in the previous
section using s = 600, b = 100. Consider our simulation compared to the other
scenarios, in the context of changing stigma s and boycott pressure b.
Figure 2.a shows a type-I (No Emissions, No Fish Catch) scenario for s =
0, b = 500. Increasing the boycott rate b reduces the number of people exposed
to the pollution. However it also lowers the demand for fish, which increases
the cost to harvest ratio. For b sufficiently large the fish catch is no longer
viable.
Figure 2.d shows a type-II (Fish Catch, No Emissions) scenario for s =
0, b = 100. We find that for s and b sufficiently low, enough people are exposed
to the pollution that social concern rises and the emissions are eliminated. The
boycott rate b is sufficiently low that the fish catch survives.
Figure 2.b shows a type-III (Emissions, No Fish Catch) scenario for s =
600, b = 800. This scenario occurs when either the stigma or boycott pressure
are sufficiently high. If the boycott rate b is increased, then people stop eating
fish to protect themselves. If they boycott at such a rate that the fish catch
collapses before enough people have been injured to cause full abatement, then
the emissions survive. On the other hand, the stigma s has no preventative
effect to truly protect people from injury. Increasing stigma causes an under-
estimation of the true injuries. If the stigma s is increased, or if s and b are
both made sufficiently large, then the number of perceived injured is too low
to stimulate emissions abatement. In addition, if s is high enough then the
abatement is low, and the fish catch loses its viability due to pollution.
The Minamata scenario results when the boycott rate b is low enough to
allow the fish catch to survive, and the stigma rate s is high enough that
injuries are underestimated and a pollution epidemic occurs.
3.2.2 Social Trade-offs
To reinforce what the time series plots in Figures 2.a,b,d,e show us about
the effect of varying boycott and stigma on the cumulative injuries, we ap-
proximate I∗ by numerically solving I for large time t = 1000000, over a
1000× 1000 grid of s and b, and plot the distribution of injuries in s-b space.
Figure 3 presents this plot next to a coloured region plot in s-b space that
demarcates the various equilibrium types I, II, III and IV.
We find that injuries are by far the highest in region type-IV. In general,
injuries are higher with increasing stigma, and lower with increasing boycott
pressure. With low stigma and high boycott pressure, there is a social trade-
off: a high number of injuries are prevented, but this happens at the expense
of the fishery, which collapses.
Observe that the simulations which result in the least number of cumulative
injured come with collateral disadvantages: steady-states I and III result in
the collapse of the fishery, which is a collapse of the economic livelihood of
a people. Steady-state III allows the emissions to continue unabated, and by
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comparing Figures 2.a,b,d,e, one can see the effect this has on stunting the
fish population. This would have major ecological ramifications for the wider
food web, which are not modelled here.
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Injuries
I∗∈ [0, 1]
Fig. 3: Parameter planes showing outcomes for various values of s and b. Plots
show (a) the dynamical outcomes defined by the equilibrium-types I, II, III,
and IV, and (b) health outcomes defined by gradations in the cumulative
injured steady state, I∗ ∈ [0, 1].
3.2.3 Sensitivity to Initial Conditions
As discussed in Section 2, the qualitative behaviour of the system depends on
the initial conditions for the fishery. If F (t0)B(t0) is sufficiently small, then
FB → 0 faster than either P → P ∗ or f(X)→ 1. In regions where we expect
a type I, II or IV equilibrium, the fish catch collapses before emissions are
abated and we get a type-III equilibrium. This is shown in Figure 4.
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Fig. 4: Parameter planes showing dynamical outcomes I, II, III, and IV for
various values of s and b with different initial fish population densities: (a)
F (1945) = 1, (b) F (1945) = 0.1, (c) F (1945) = 0.01. This demonstrates the
system’s dependence on its initial conditions.
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3.2.4 A Pollution Epidemic is Unlikely Without Stigma/Misperception
It is very important to recognize how unlikely the conditions for the pollution
epidemic (or type-IV equilibrium) are without social stigma/misperception.
As Figure 2 shows us, the type-IV equilibrium does not exist unless s > 0 and
s is sufficiently large.
We ask: what parameters are required for us to have a pollution epidemic
when s = 0, and how physically plausible are they compared to the parameters
in Table 2.2 that we used in our simulation?
First let us consider decreasing h, the health concern, so that region IV
intersects with the b-axis. Theoretically, the largest value of h needed for
this to occur is when s = 0 and the contour lines hβ(1+b) = 0.4 and c <
H
(
1− b
(
1
1+b
))
intersect. Assuming that the injuries grow to P ∗ = 11+b+s
and the demand for abatement is X∗ = hβ
1
1+b+s , this intersection should occur
when h = 3.2
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Fig. 5: Parameter planes showing dynamical regimes for various values of b
and s, with decreasing health concern: (a) h = 1000, (b) h = 300, (c) h = 3.
The time series plots in (d) show solutions of the system for h = 3, s = 0,
b = 0.4. We find that the small values of h and b make the social response
to injuries negligible. Emissions are unabated and the fish catch collapses. An
ongoing pollution epidemic is averted.
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However, as Figure 5 shows, if we solve the steady-states numerically for
h = 3, s = 0 and b = 0.4, we find that a pollution epidemic does not occur in
the region where we expect it to. In effect, the very small h and b make the
social repsonse to the pollution negligible. The fish catch collapses before the
injuries grow large enough to trigger any abatement. Emissions continue but
exposure stops, so a pollution epidemic is averted.
In the absence of misperception, a pollution epidemic is possible provided
that the social feedbacks to stop it are negligible and the fish catch survives.
However, we find that it is unlikely for the fish catch to coexist with unabated
emissions.
In the case of Minamata, the social feedbacks were not neglible; the fish
boycott and demand for abatement were significant feedbacks. Unfortunately,
the reduction in emissions made it possible for the fish catch to coexist with
the emissions.
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Fig. 6: Parameter planes showing dynamical regimes for various values of b and
s, with decreasing boat costs: (a) c = 0.35, (b) c = 0.1, (c) c = 0.001. The time
series plots in (d) show solutions of the system for c = 0.001, s = 0, b = 800.
We find that the boats survive at an unrealistically high level. The growth
of the boats forces the fish population toward zero. Over a short time-scale,
I ′ ≈ 0 and growth of injuries is negligible.
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Now let us consider changing the boat costs. With c < 0.0012, we find that
region IV intersects the b-axis. As the numerical simulations in Figure 6 show,
the operating cost for the boats is unrealistically low, the boats grow to an un-
realistically high level and push the fish population toward zero. For the short
time-scale we are interested in, the potential for a pollution epidemic is averted
by the decline of the fish catch to near-zero levels. If we solve numerically as
t → ∞, it turns out that the fish and boats exhibit damped oscillations, and
the injuries grow.
Then, in the absence of misperception, we do find that a pollution epidemic
is possible with reduced boat costs, but that it relies on the unlikely and
infeasible condition that a large number of boats survives by fishing a near-
zero fish population over a large time scale.
Therefore, a pollution epidemic relies on the presence of stigma or misper-
ception.
4 Discussion
The coupled HES model presented in this paper allows us to investigate the
dynamics of pollution exposure as intimately linked to the local environment,
the economy, and social decisions. The analysis and simulations of this model
show us at least three important things: (1) increasing stigma/misperception
undermines the social feedbacks that protect people from pollution. (2) A
pollution epidemic steady-state occurs when emissions and fish ingestion con-
tinue indefinitely. The occurrence of this steady-state is highly unlikely with-
out stigma/misperception. (3) With multiple socially desirable outcomes, feed-
backs can cause one outcome to undermine the other. Here, the scenarios that
prevent the most injuries also cause the commercial fishery to collapse.
This model represents misperception effects in a novel and critical way.
In the model, social decisions to boycott fish-eating and abate pollution are
made from information about the perceived variables, F ,B,P and X. These
variables can reach a false equilibrium that is blind to I, the actual injuries,
which grow unperceived in the background. The prevention of injuries involves
a trade-off: either the emissions or the fish catch must stop. One is a cost to
the polluting industry, the other is a cost to the fishing industry.
In the context of the Minamata pollution epidemic, this HES model rep-
resents the conditions that might have persisted for decades in Minamata if a
second methylmercury-poisoning incident had not occurred in Niigata, Japan.
This model is focused on the localized relationships that are endogenous to
Minamata and its people, which allowed the social response to pollution to
settle to a false equilibrium. It remains future work to incorporate the effects
of a singular external event such as Niigata that shook Minamata from its
false equilibrium.
In the case of Minamata, the neglect of the government and industry fed a
stigma of Minamata’s pollution victims. Although the extent of the neglect and
the stigma may seem like relics of a different time and place, they are not. For
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example, the recent struggle of residents in Mossville Louisiana (Subra 2007;
Livingston 2013), and the ongoing struggles of activists in China’s cancer
villages (Tianjie 2009; Van Rooij 2010) show that the pursuit of economic
expediency at the expense of human welfare remains a pivotal obstacle in
resolving pollution epidemics.
The model has several limitations that are common to simple compart-
mental ODE models, and others that are particular to the phenomenon being
modelled, such as social dynamics and dose-response relationships. Overall,
the modeller must find a balance between detailed realism on one hand, and
a parsimonious representation that is mathematically tractable, on the other.
Our model takes the pollution to be spatially localized and homogeneously
distributed in a closed bay. This neglects the role of diffusion and fish mi-
gration in spreading the contamination to people beyond Minamata bay. We
also assume that the social dynamics are independent of space. This is unre-
alistic insofar as social concern and demand for abatement is stronger among
population groups that live farther from the polluting industry.
The model aggregates individual and species-level variability. The use of
a single variable F for all sea animals obscures the multi-species interactions
and diversity of a real ecosystem. The assumption that the pollutant con-
centration in fish is population-averaged neglects variability due to fish size,
age and location. Similarly, by modelling the human exposure to pollution as
population-averaged, we unrealistically assume that all fish-eaters ingest at the
same rate and face the same risks. We class all human injuries as “injured”,
regardless of the severity or type of symptoms. These aggregations can be
corrected by adding population compartments for species, age, or fish-eating
classes to our equations. Alternatively, the system can be hybridized with a
discrete agent-based model that represents individual-level variability using a
network of interacting agents.
Another assumption is that the accumulation of the pollutant in fish is
directly proportional to the emissions loading at any time, without delay. This
circumvents the use of mass-balance equations to model the accumulation
process of the pollutant in water, sediment, and organisms. In the model, fish
mortality and human injury occur upon contact with the pollutant, without
delay. Although Methylmercury does rapidly accumulate and cause damage
to organisms, when it is encountered chronically and at lower concentrations,
a time lag becomes relevant. We can introduce mass-balance equations to
represent more steps in the pollutant accumulation, or introduce time delay
terms to the existing equations.
Note that the model takes pollution injuries to be irreversible. This is a rea-
sonable assumption for methylmercury-poisoning, where the severity of some
symptoms may be reduced by medical treatment but most patients remain
injured for life. Our model is not suitable to model pollution sicknesses that
can be treated quickly.
We also remark that the utility function in the equation for X ′ could be
improved by including a term to represent the fishermens’ concern over damage
to the fish catch.
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Lastly, we observe that the model represents a localized social learning
process which is isolated from external events, and external opinions. The
Niigata pollution epidemic was an event that changed the social attitudes of
people across Japan to oppose the polluting industry in Minamata. Concerned
citizens in Minamata depended on external allies and protests to galvanize
public attention for their cause. To model a singular external effect such as
Niigata, we can introduce an impulse term +η(t)(I − P ) in the equation for
P ′(t), which acts to correct misperception given an impulse η(t) > 0.
Despite these limitations, coupled HES models can provide insights regard-
ing the interactions between natural dynamics, pollution dynamics, and hu-
man social dynamics. Recent cases from Mossville, Lousiana, and from China’s
“cancer villages” emphasize the relevance of stigma and misperception to con-
temporary pollution problems. Coupled HES models that include mispercep-
tion effects as part of their human-environment interactions are highly topical
and should be further studied.
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